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1 Introduction
One of the most striking economic facts of the last decade is certainly the long
lived expansion experienced by the US economy (around 4% of annual growth in
productivity on average during the 1990s). Most industrial countries have benefited
from the same conditions though at a lower extent. An important aspect of this
expansion episode concerns the role of information and communication technologies
(ICT). There is an unanimous view according to which ICT have been indeed the
driving force behind the 1990s boom (Gordon, 2000, Jorgenson and Stiroh, 2000,
and Oliner and Sichel, 2000). Indeed, productivity growth has been so impressive
in the ICT sectors and the weight of such sectors in the economy has increased so
markedly in the 1990s that there cannot be any doubt about the leading role of ICT
in the boom.
Nonetheless, an intense debate on the precise role of ICT as a long term growth
engine is still taking place. Is the ICT-induced growth in productivity just the result
of a pure capital deepening mechanism, of massive purchases of ICT equipment,
following the dramatic fall in the price of ICT tools? Or are there any ICT usage
effects on total factor productivity in the non-ICT sectors? For Gordon, once the
cyclical effects removed, there is no evidence on the existence of spillovers from the
ICT sector (mainly hardware) to the rest of the economy. This view is challenged
by Oliner and Sichel, for example.
∗We acknowledge the financial support of the Belgian French speaking community (ARC 99/04-
235) and of the Belgian Federal Government (PAI P5/10). The usual disclaimer applies.
†IRES and CORE, Catholic University of Louvain. boucekkine@ires.ucl.ac.be.
‡Corresponding author. CNRS-Laboratoire d’Econometrie, Ecole Polytechnique and IRES,
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For Askenazy and Gianella (2000), the absence of a compelling evidence on the ex-
istence of such spillovers on aggregate data reflect the role of organizational change.
In the industries where new organizational practices (towards more flexibility) have
accompanied the (rising) investment in ICT tools, the resulting productivity gains
are significant. In others, such an adaptation effort in work organization has not
been undertaken, and the increasing investment in ICT equipment has not proven
productivity enhancing. In a few words, it seems that ICT investment and organi-
zational change are complementary, spillovers only take place when some adequate
changes in work organization are performed. Early empirical corroborations of such
a complementarity property are due to Black and Lynch (2000), and Bresnahan et
al. (2002).
As reported by Osterman (1994), there is an increasing use of flexible organization
forms in the US. In the early 1990s, almost the two thirds of American firms use
flexible forms of workplace organization, at least partially. Typical flexible organi-
zations include work teams, job rotation, total quality control and quality circles.
In particular, the ability of a worker to perform different tasks is becoming a key
requirement. Obviously, multi-tasking also raises the skills requirements, so that a
natural trend would be an increasing average level of workers’ qualifications as long
as multi-tasking practices continue to be adopted. Indeed, as documented more pre-
cisely in appendix 6.1 (tables I to III), the increasing employment share of skilled
workers is a clearly observed fact both in the US economy and in major OECD
countries during the 1990s.
The adoption of more flexible organizational forms and the spread of multi-tasking
practices is tightly liked to computerization. By making information cheaper and
more abundant, the diffusion of information and communication technologies in-
creases informational task complementarities, which in turn favors the adoption of
multi-tasking. This is the main argument we put forward along this paper to connect
ICT adoption with the rise of multi-tasking. There are more arguments in the liter-
ature around the impact of computers on tasks content design. For example, Autor,
Levy and Murname (2001) study how computer technology alters job skill demands
over 1960-1998 within American Firms. They show that computer capital appears
to substitute for a limited and well-defined set of human activities, those involving
routine (repetitive) cognitive and manual tasks; and complements activities involv-
ing non-routine problem solving and interactive tasks. Provided these tasks are
imperfect substitutes, their model implies measurable changes in the task content of
employment, which they explore using representative data on job task requirements.
Computerization is associated with declining relative industry demand for routine
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manual and cognitive tasks and increased relative demand for non-routine cognitive
tasks. Notable changes in working conditions have indeed been observed in Europe
during the 1990s. As documented precisely in appendix 6.1 these changes occured
both at an aggregate level and at a more micro level. At an aggregate level, changes
in working conditions involve new paces and methods of work (see Table IV), while
at the firm level, they imply more intense job rotation and multi-tasking.
But if the development of multi-tasking relies on the returns to task complementar-
ities, it also creates complex interactions among the different activities performed.
When production requires the realization of a series of tasks, mistakes in any of them
can widely reduce the product’s value. In the extreme case of O-ring technologies1
(Kremer, 1993), interactions among tasks are multiplicative so that the entire value
of output can be destroyed if only one task is incorrectly performed. The workers’
productivity, which can be assimilated to the probability of correctly performing
a task in Kremer’s model, then interact in such a way that the quantity of labor
is not perfectly substitutable to labor quality. An increase in the productivity of
skilled workers can in turn makes it more profitable for skilled workers to work by
themselves in separate reorganized firms to avoid that unskilled workers put down-
ward pressure on the productivity of skilled workers (Kremer and Maskin, 1996 and
Acemoglu, 1999).
Summing up, one can identify three main trends in major OECD countries during
the past two decades:
• An increase in the employment shares of skilled workers
• An important adoption of new technologies, especially micro computers
• The adoption of organizational forms favoring job rotation, team work, quality,
with emphasis on multi-tasking
This paper is aimed at providing a dynamic framework allowing to capture the
three trends outlined above: more computers in the workplace, more skilled people,
and increasing multi-tasking. The literature of this field is overwhelmingly static
so far. The dynamic flavor of our model comes from a standard human capital
accumulation engine. We ultimately show that an (exogenous) improvement in
the productivity of education and/or an ICT shock do induce a transition from
1O-rings were one of the components of the space shuttle Challenger. This shuttle exploded
because the launching temperature caused these components to malfunction.
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specialization to multi-tasking. ICT shocks are modelled is such a way that they
reflect an increase in informational task complementarities, thus rising the return to
multi-tasking.
A previous important contribution to the literature of organizational choice is Lind-
beck and Snower (2000). However, these authors study the problem of organizational
choices in a static framework with exogenous skills. In their framework, work orga-
nization is modelled through by the time allocation of workers among several tasks.
Specialization arises when workers perform only one task, while multi-tasking does
when workers allocate their working time between the multiple activities. In decid-
ing whether workers should specialize or perform multiple tasks, firms hence face a
trade-off between two sets of returns: “returns from specialization” or “intra-task
learning” whereby the more time a worker spends on a task, the higher his pro-
ductivity from this task, and “returns from multi-tasking” or “inter-task learning”
whereby a worker can use the information and skills acquired at one task to increase
his productivity at another task.
We borrow this elementary allocation problem from Lindbeck and Snower. However,
in our dynamic model, returns to specialization and multi-tasking are influenced
by (exogenous) technological change and specially by endogenous human capital
accumulation, and we are able to address the issue of transition from specialization
to multitasking. Indeed, the role of human capital in organizational change is out
of question as we have already argued above. Even for fixed technology, the level
of human capital has been shown to be crucial in the determination of workplace
organization. For example, Autor, Levy and Murnane (2002) neatly show how
the same technology results in more specialization for low skilled employees and less
specialization-and thus more multi-tasking- for high skilled. Our model is consistent
with these findings. In particular, it predicts that there exists a threshold for human
capital above which the transition from specialization to multi-tasking occurs.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops the model, and Section 3
analyzes the stationary equilibria. Section 4 studies the dynamics and transition
from specialization to multi-tasking. Section 5 concludes.
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2 The model
2.1 Workers′ production function
Firms produce a homogenous good using labor as only input. Production relies
on the realization of k = 1, ...n tasks. For the sake of simplicity, we restrict our
attention to the case of two productive tasks: n = 2. Firms have to decide the range
and proportion of tasks that will be performed. Both aspects are embedded into the
allocation of the workers’ time between both tasks. When workers are assigned to
one task only, work organization is based on specialization, when workers perform
both tasks work organization is based on multi-tasking.
As in Lindbeck and Snower (2000), the efficiency units of labor supplied by workers
have two determinants: returns to specialization and returns to multi-tasking. Re-
turns to specialization imply that a worker’s productivity at one task increases with
his exposure to that task. Returns to multi-tasking rely on the idea that a worker
can also use the information and skills acquired at one task to improve his perfor-
mance at another task. This kind of returns can be considered as “informational
task complementarities”. There are many examples of informational complementar-
ities in real life: working on various parts of an automobile (rather than specializing
on the motor part for example), working on an entire banking transaction for one
client...etc...
The tasks need not be radically distinct in nature. Our model bears all possible
interpretations. It entails the configuration outlined by Autor, Murnane and Levy
(2001), mentioned in the introduction, with a first manual task and a second non-
repetitive task. But given the specifications of the returns to specialization Vs
multi-tasking given just below, mainly involving time spent at each task and workers’
human capital, the two tasks need not be so radically differentiated.2
We normalize workers’ available time to one and denote by τt the time devoted
to task 1 and (1 − τt) the time devoted to task 2. We consider that returns to
specialization simply capture the fact that the greater the fraction of the worker’s
working time devoted to a particular task, the more productive he becomes at that
task. However, we consider that human capital complements the time devoted to
task 1. Returns to specialization are therefore given by:
s(τt, ht) = At · τt · hαt (1)
2As pointed out by an anonymous referee, the second task need not be non-repetitive. There
are many examples of repetitive second tasks- say, a professor who now types her own papers.
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where 0 < α < 1, ht is the worker’s human capital, and At > 0 is a productivity
parameter.3
Returns to multi-tasking exhibit more complex interactions. We consider that
when a worker’s attention is allocated to several tasks, there exist multiplicative
interactions among them. 4 Returns to multi-tasking are therefore the product of
two components: informational task complementarities and the quality of work per-
formed (i.e. the worker’s human capital). For informational task complementarities
to exist, the worker must spend time both on task 1 and on task 2. Informational
task complementarities are hence given by τt · (1 − τt). In addition, human capital
complement informational task complementarities in the determination of returns
to multi-tasking. Returns to multi-tasking are hence defined by:
m(τt, ht) = Bt · τt · (1− τt) · hβt (2)
where Bt is a productivity parameter, 0 < β < 1 and 0 < α < 1. The output of
a worker with human capital ht is then given by:
yt = At · τt · hαt +Bt · τt · (1− τt) · hβt (3)
In contrast to Lindbeck and Snower (2000, 2001), we do not assume a fixed allocation
of the workforce between two categories of workers. In our set-up, endogenous
human capital accumulation is allowed, ultimately leading to a dynamic model of
organizational change. As claimed in the introduction, our story is consistent with
the findings of Autor, Levy and Murnane (2001), who claim that organizational
change is the result of the interaction between available technologies and available
skills. In particular, the level of human capital is decisive for a given technology to
induce a push towards multi-tasking and other more flexible forms of organization
in the workplace. Precisely in our model, the returns to multi-tasking and the
returns to specialization depend on the level of human capital. In particular, on the
one hand, the marginal return of time spent on task 1 depends on a technological
parameter and human capital, but not on the time spent on this task. On the other
hand, the marginal return of time spent on task 2 not only depends on technology
and human capital, but it also depends on informational task complementarity, that
is on the time spent on task 1.
3We thus assume that firms hire only one sort of worker, i.e. one type of human capital. As
pointed out by an anonymous referee, this is not an innocuous assumption: a strong heterogeneity
of human capital in the work place may be a barrier to the spread multi-tasking, for example
consistently with Kremer’s O-ring theory (1993).
4This specification is again consistent with the “O-ring technologies”, see Kremer (1993).
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2.2 Optimal work organization
What we call work organization in this model is the optimal time allocation mode.
When τt = 1, work organization is specialized, whereas when τt < 1 work organiza-
tion is based on multi-tasking.
Firms determine the optimal share of workers’ time devoted to task 1 (τt) and
task 2 (1− τt) and the optimal quantity of labor input that maximize profits 5. The
profits of a production unit employing Nt individuals with human capital level ht
are given by:
pit = [yt − wt] ·Nt (4)
where wt ≡ w(ht) is the wage rate of a worker with human capital ht.
The optimal work organization and quantity of labor input are the solutions of
the following program:
max
τt , Nt
pit = [yt − wt] ·Nt
s.c. yt = Atτth
α
t +Btτt(1− τt)hβt
• The first order condition on τt writes6:
Ath
α
t +Bth
β
t (1− 2τt) ≥ 0
The optimal time allocation is therefore given by:
 τt = 1 if ht ≤ ht ≡
(
At
Bt
) 1
β−α
τt =
1
2
[
1 + At
Bt
hα−βt
]
if ht > ht ≡
(
At
Bt
) 1
β−α
(5)
5Lindbeck and Snower (2001) consider that employees have discretion over the proportions in
which different tasks are performed (i.e. the task mix) and that, in the absence of centralized
bargaining, the firm can offer a different wage to worker at each task. The employees’ freedom to
decide upon the task mix, that is the employees’ autonomy, would indeed be adapted to organiza-
tions with pay plans based on individual performance measures (see, for instance, Holmstro¨m and
Milgrom, 1991). This leads them naturally to focus on the relationship between centralized bar-
gaining and reorganization. Our ambition is different and the issue of unionization and imperfectly
competitive wage setting rules is beyond the scope of our paper. Indeed, relying on a competitive
wage setting rule, we analyze on employees’ education decisions in a dynamic context, given orga-
nizational choices at the employer level. This leads us to focus on the interactions between human
capital accumulation and reorganization.
6The second order condition is always satisfied: −2Bthβt < 0.
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• Given the linearity of the problem with respect to Nt, we can extract the
traditional zero-profit condition:
wt = yt (6)
Given the optimal work organization (5), we get:
{
wt = Ath
α
t if ht ≤ ht
wt =
h−βt
4Bt
[
Ath
α
t +Bth
β
t
]2
if ht > ht
(7)
2.3 The workers′ behavior
The economy is populated by overlapping generations of individuals who live for two
periods. They decide to invest in human capital in the first period and they work in
the second period. To simplify, individuals do not consume during the first period.
We denote by t + 1 the generation born in t. The utility function of a member of
this generation is given by7:
ut+1 = ln(1− et) + ln ct+1
where et denotes time spent on education in the first period. Total time being
normalized to 1, (1 − et) represents leisure time. ct+1 denotes second period’s con-
sumption. Given that individuals do not consume in the first period, the budget
constraint writes ct+1 ≤ wt+1 where the wage rate is defined by equation (7).
The level of human capital of a member of generation t + 1, ht+1, depends on
two elements: the time spent acquiring education in the first period, et, and human
capital of the previous generation ht: ht+1 = h(et, ht) where h(., .) is increasing in
both arguments, differentiable and concave. To obtain analytical results, we rely on
the specific functional form
ht+1 = Et · (et)a · (ht)1−a (8)
where Et is an efficiency parameter and 0 < a < 1.
7Lindbeck and Snower assume that reservation wages express the preferences of workers for
specialization or multi-tasking. This induces a non convexity in the disutility of effort. Our model
is different since we model preferences in an intertemporal framework where there is a trade-off
between education and consumption.
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Individual decisions hence are made according to the following program:
max
et
ln(1− et) + ln(wt+1)
s.c. ht+1 = Et · (et)a · (ht)1−a
This program leads to the following condition:
1
1− et =
∂(lnwt+1)
∂ht+1
· ∂ht+1
∂et
(9)
Given (7), we get:
et =
aφ (ht+1)
1 + aφ (ht+1)
(10)
where φ(.) is such that:
φ (ht+1) = α if ht+1 ≤ ht+1
φ (ht+1) =
(2α−β)At+1(ht+1)α+βBt+1(ht+1)β
At+1(ht+1)
α+Bt+1(ht+1)β
if ht+1 > ht+1
(11)
Given equation (8), the dynamics of human capital is governed by the following
equation:
ht+1 = Et ·
(
aφ (ht+1)
1 + aφ (ht+1)
)a
· (ht)1−a (12)
When ht+1 > ht+1, the relationship between ht and ht+1 is still functional, i.e.
to each ht corresponds a unique ht+1. Equation (12) can indeed be rewritten as
ht+1 = ht ·
(
E
1
a
t · 1ht+1 ·
aφ(ht+1)
1+aφ(ht+1)
) a
1−a
, that is:
ht+1 = ht · (1−G(ht+1))
a
1−a , G(ht+1) = 1− E
1
a
t ·
1
ht+1
· aφ (ht+1)
1 + aφ (ht+1)
We show in Appendix (6.2) that function G(.) is strictly increasing. Using the
implicit function theorem, ht+1 therefore is monotonic and strictly increasing in ht.
For each ht corresponds a unique ht+1.
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3 Stationary equilibria
We first study the existence of solutions under a stationary environment. In particu-
lar, we assume that At, Bt and Et are constant, equal to A, E and B. The threshold
human capital value is therefore constant equal to h =
(
A
B
) 1
β−α . This stationary
threshold value defines two possible steady state regimes: specialization below this
value, and multi-tasking above. Let es (respectively em) and hs ≤ h (respectively
hm > h) denote the steady-state values of education investments and human capital
in the specialization regime (respectively in the multi-tasking regime). We shall
study the existence and uniqueness of these equilibrium values.
To get an immediate idea about how the model works in this respect, notice that
given equations (8), (10), and (11) we have:
es =
αa
1 + αa
, hs = E
1
a · αa
1 + αa
(13)
However, this stationary value of human capital under specialization only makes
sense if hs ≤ h. This conditions imposes the following restriction on the environment:
E
1
a · αa
1 + αa
≤
(
A
B
) 1
β−α
. (C1)
Notice that condition (C1) holds with equality if and only if hs = h. Condition
(C1) can be interpreted in two ways. For fixed “organizational parameters”, A, B,
α and β, the specialization equilibrium exists if and only if the education produc-
tivity variable E is small enough. In other words, specialization is an equilibrium
organization of work when the productivity of the education technology is too low
to allow reaching the threshold value of human capital above which firms would
choose multi-tasking. Another interpretation is that for fixed education parame-
ters, condition (C1) implies a lower bound for the ratio A
B
, which implies that the
specialization equilibrium exists if A is large enough with respect to B, which is a
very natural outcome. Intuitively, specialization is an equilibrium organization of
work when the relative technological productivity of labor services in such a case
(A compared to B) is high enough. Does a multi-tasking equilibrium exist in such a
case? Notice that if such an equilibrium exists, then the multi-tasking equilibrium
effort and human capital are respectively:
em =
aφ (hm)
1 + aφ (hm)
, hm = E
1
a · aφ (hm)
1 + aφ (hm)
(14)
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where φ (hm) =
(2α−β)A(hm)α+βB(hm)β
A(hm)
α+B(hm)β
.
We assume that parameters α and β are such that
α < β < 2α (A1)
Assumption (A1) is a sufficient condition for the multi-tasking equilibrium, when
it exists, to be unique.8 The interpretation of this assumption is the following.
The optimal work organization, combined to the stationary level of human capital
accumulated by workers, leads to a unique multi-tasking equilibrium as long as
the contribution of human capital to the returns to labor services is higher in the
multi-tasking organization than in the specialization-based structure (β > α), but it
should not be not too high for a stationary level of human capital to exist (β < 2α).
The analysis is much less trivial in the case of multi-tasking. The following propo-
sition summarizes the findings regarding these issues.
Proposition 1: Steady states
Under assumption (A1), the model has a unique steady state. If condition (C1) is
fulfilled, the specialization equilibrium prevails. If not, the multi-tasking equilibrium
does.
Proof:
The existence and uniqueness of the steady-state with specialization is immediate
from equation (13) under condition (C1). The existence of the multi-tasking equi-
librium amounts to solving the equation G(h) = 0 with G(h) = 1−E 1a · 1
h
· aφ(h)
1+aφ(h)
.
We have: lim
h→0
φ (h) = (2α− β) , lim
h→+∞
φ (h) = β and therefore, under assumption
A1:
lim
h→0
G (h) = −∞, lim
h→+∞
G (h) = 1
We show in Appendix (6.2) that function G(.) is strictly increasing on R+. Hence,
there exists a multi-tasking equilibrium if and only if G(h) < 0. Notice that this
condition is exactly the opposite of (C1) since φ
(
h
)
= α. So under (C1), we cannot
have a multi-tasking equilibrium.
Assume now that (C1) does not hold. Then,
E
1
a · αa
1 + αa
>
(
A
B
) 1
β−α
.
8Therefore, (A1) is a uniqueness condition, not an existence condition, and it is only needed to
ensure the uniqueness of the multi-tasking equilibrium.
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In such a case, the specialization equilibrium cannot exist. In contrast, since G(h) <
0 if (C1) is violated, a multi-tasking equilibrium exists and is unique. 
It follows that the values of the exogenous variables A, B and E are crucial in the
nature of the long term organizational regime. If the education effort is efficient
enough and/or if the multi-tasking regime is profitable enough (relatively to special-
ization), the unique possible stationary equilibrium is multi-tasking, and vice versa.
Of course, it remains to study if the obtained stationary equilibria are stable.
4 Dynamics and transition from specialization to
multi-tasking
We shall now study the global dynamics. As announced in the introduction section,
we will also identify the cases where a transition from specialization to multi-tasking
takes place.
4.1 Global dynamics under condition (C1)
Consider a situation where the environment is stationary, i.e. with constant At, Bt
and Et, and where condition (C1) holds. Hence, by Proposition 1, the specialization
regime is the unique prevailing stationary equilibrium. Suppose that the initial value
of human capital is bigger than hs: hs < h0. The following proposition gives the
exact dynamics in such a case when hs < h.
Proposition 2. Transition dynamics when hs < h
Under assumptions (A1), provided (C1) holds, if hs < h0, the equilibrium sequence
ht, t ≥ 0, decreases to the specialization human capital stationary value hs. If 0 <
h0 < hs, the equilibrium sequence ht, t ≥ 0, increases to the specialization human
capital stationary value hs.
Proof.
Let us start with the case h0 > hs. We will prove that the human capital sequence
is decreasing and bounded from below by hs; hence it is converging necessarily to
the fixed point hs.
First suppose hs < ht < h. Then, either ht+1 > h or ht+1 < h. In the latter case:
ht+1 = E (et)
a · (ht)1−a, and et = αa1+αa .
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Since hs < ht, we get: ht+1 > E (et)
a · (hs)1−a, so that:
ht+1
hs
> E (et)
a · (hs)−a.
Given that es = et for every t when ht < h, and as hs = E
1
a es, it follows that
ht+1
hs
> 1. The human capital sequence is bounded from below by the fixed point
of the sequence hs. Moreover, we have:
ht+1
ht
= E (et)
a · (ht)−a, and provided that
ht > hs, it follows that:
ht+1
ht
< E (et)
a · (hs)−a.
Again, we use the relations es = et and hs = E
1
a es since when ht < h, and we get
immediately ht+1
ht
< 1.
Hence if ht+1 < h, we have hs < ht+1 < ht < h.
Suppose now that 0 < ht < h and ht+1 > h. Then, et =
a φ(ht+1)
1+a φ(ht+1)
, and ht+1 =
E
(
a φ(ht+1)
1+a φ(ht+1)
)a
· (ht)1−a.
We can rewrite the equation just above as:
ht+1
ht
=
(
E
1
a a φ(ht+1)
ht+1 (1 + a φ(ht+1))
) a
1−a
,
we then have: ht+1
ht
= [1−G(ht+1)]
a
1−a .
Since condition (C1) is fulfilled, 0 < G(x) < 1 for every x ≥ h. As ht+1 > h, it
follows that ht+1
ht
< 1, which contradicts the assumption ht < h and ht+1 > h.
It follows that whence ht < h, ht+1 is necessarily below the threshold, and hs <
ht+1 < ht. Convergence follows.
Consider now the case where ht > h. Then either ht+1 is below the threshold and
we come back to the previous case, or ht+1 is above the threshold, and in such a case
we have the relation: ht+1
ht
= [1−G(ht+1)]
a
1−a , with 0 < G(x) < 1 for every x ≥ h.
The sequence is in any case strictly decreasing. At some point in time, it should go
below the threshold h value,9, and then it converges to the unique fixed point under
(C1), namely hs.
9Notice that this should be the case because if the human capital sequence does not go below
the threshold, this would mean that we have a strictly decreasing sequence bounded below by the
threshold, thus converging. As the sequence is generated by a continuous-though not everywhere
differentiable- map, it should converge to a fixed-point of the map. There is no fixed point above
the threshold when (C1) holds.
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By similar arguments, we can prove that the same monotonic behavior arises when
0 < h0 < hs. 
Figure 2 depicts the dynamical system when condition (C1) holds with hs < h.
The trivial case hs = h is studied in appendix 6.3. A final comment on wage
equilibrium pattern when condition (C1) holds can be made. In this case, the
returns to specialization and wages are equal: wt = Ath
α
t and s(τ = 1, ht) = Ath
α
t if
ht ≤ ht. Wage is an increasing function of human capital (∂wt/∂ht = αAthα−1t > 0).
Since wages are competitive, an increase in the efficiency units of labor supplied due
to rising human capital, raises wages.
We now study the dynamics when condition (C1) is violated.
4.2 Global dynamics when condition (C1) does not hold
If (C1) does not hold, the multi-tasking equilibrium is the unique steady state.
Moreover in such a case, G(x) < 0 for h < x < hm and G(x) > 0 for x > hm. This
allows us to establish the following characterization of the global dynamics in such
a case.
Proposition 3. Transition dynamics when h0 > hm
Under assumptions (A1), if condition (C1) does not hold, and h0 > hm, the equi-
librium sequence ht, t ≥ 0, decreases to the multi-tasking human capital stationary
value hm.
Proof.
Suppose that ht > hm. Then, we have either ht+1 > h or ht+1 < h.
Consider first the case where ht+1 > h so that
ht+1
ht
=[1−G(ht+1)] a1−a .
We have two possible sub-cases: either ht+1 > hm or ht+1 < hm. The second sub-case
is impossible. Indeed, as G(x) < 0 for x < hm, we have
ht+1
ht
> 1, which contradicts
ht > hm and ht+1 < hm. In contrast, if ht+1 > hm, we get no contradiction. Because
1 > G(x) > 0 for x > hm, it follows that: hm < ht+1 < ht.
This is indeed the unique possible case since the alternative ht+1 < h is also impos-
sible. Indeed, in such an alternative case, we have
ht+1 = E
(
αa
1 + αa
)a
· (ht)1−a,
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and because ht > hm > h and E
1
a · αa
1+αa
> h (condition (C1) violated), it follows
that:
ht+1 >
(
h
)a · (h)1−a = h. 
It remains to study the dynamics in the case where h0 < hm.
Proposition 4. Transition dynamics when h0 < hm
Under assumptions A1, if condition (C1) does not hold, and h0 < hm, the equi-
librium sequence ht, t ≥ 0, increases to the multi-tasking human capital stationary
value hm.
Proof.
Let us first consider the case h < ht < hm. We can prove exactly as in the end of the
proof of Proposition 3, that ht+1 ≤ h is impossible in such a case. Thus ht+1 > h.
A priori two sub-cases are still possible: either ht+1 > hm or ht+1 < hm. Again we
use the law of motion, ht+1
ht
= [1−G(ht+1)] a1−a , to discriminate. Indeed, notice that
since 1 > G(x) > 0 when x > hm, we have
ht+1
ht
< 1 if ht+1 > hm, which contradicts
ht < hm. Therefore: ht+1 < hm. It follows that when the sequence starts below hm
(and above the threshold value), it converges monotonically to hm.
We now end our analysis by solving the case of an initial condition below the thresh-
old value, ht < h. We have either ht+1 > h, and in such a case, it is trivial to show
using the same argument just above that necessarily ht+1 < hm, and we end up with
the same story as before. Less trivially, the case ht+1 < h, is solved by noticing that
since the evolution of capital is given by:
ht+1 = E
(
αa
1 + αa
)a
· (ht)1−a,
we have:
ht+1
ht
> E
(
αa
1 + αa
)a
· (h)−a,
which implies since E
1
a · αa
1+αa
> h (condition (C1) violated), that is ht+1
ht
> 1. The
sequence is increasing, and at some point in time, it should go above the threshold
value, h,10 and converge to the unique fixed point under (C1), namely hm. 
Figure 3 depicts the dynamical system when condition (C1) does not hold. We
now turn to the determinants of organizational change, that is the transition from
specialization to multi-tasking.
10By the same argument as in Footnote 7.
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When condition (C1) does not hold, the returns to multi-tasking and wages are
also increasing functions of human capital11. This human capital effect is however
higher in the multi-tasking than in the specialization regime. Indeed, in the former
case, returns to human capital are the sum of returns to specialization and returns
to multi-tasking, while in the latter case returns to human capital are uniquely
composed of returns to specialization. Hence, in addition to the human capital effect,
there is also a multi-tasking effect on wages. This property has been documented by
Chaudhury (2002) who shows that the trend towards multi-tasking implies steeper
individual age-wage profiles.
4.3 Transition from specialization to multi-tasking
We have shown that under a stationary environment, the steady-state regime is ei-
ther the specialization regime (condition (C1) fulfilled) or the multi-tasking regime
(condition (C1) violated). To analyze the conditions for a transition from the special-
ization regime to the multi-tasking regime, we consider two different types of shock:
a shock on the efficiency parameter of the education technology E, or a shock on
the parameters of the returns to specialization and multi-tasking, A and B. Given
the structure of our model, the transition dynamics from one organizational form to
another is endogenous.
Following Autor, Levy and Murname (2001), we may interpret time spent on task
1 as time spent on routine cognitive and manual task, and time spent on task 2
as activities requiring non-repetitive tasks.12 Hence, our analysis of the transition
from specialization to multi-tasking disentangles two kinds of shocks generating work
reorganization. On the one hand, we consider technological advances embedded into
information technologies that increase the relative returns of non-routine problem
solving and interactive tasks, which corresponds to an increase in the technological
ratio B/A. On the other hand, we consider advances in the education system that
improve the ability of individuals to learn how to perform various activities, that is
how to become more versatile, which corresponds in the model to an increase in the
efficiency of education E.
Proposition 6. Transition from specialization to multi-tasking
A large enough increase in the efficiency of the education technology E or in the
11When wt =
h−βt
4Bt
[
Ath
α
t +Bth
β
t
]2
and under A1, ∂wt/∂ht = wtht ·
(2α−β)Athαt +βBthβt
Athαt +Bth
β
t
> 0.
12As mentioned in Section 2, this is just a plausible interpretation of the tasks, the second task
need not be non-repetitive.
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relative returns to multi-tasking B/A generates a transition from a specialization
stationary regime to a multi-tasking regime.
Proof.
Let consider an initial situation in which condition (C1) is fulfilled and such that
the specialization regime prevails. The stationary value of human capital under
specialization is such that: E
1
a · αa
1+αa
<
(
A
B
) 1
β−α . We have to show that after an
increase in E or in B/A, the multi-tasking regime prevails and is such that hm >
E
1
a · αa
1+αa
.
Consider first an increase in the efficiency parameter of the education technology
from E to E˜, large enough and such that
E˜
1
a · αa
1 + αa
> h =
(
A
B
) 1
β−α
.
Let h˜ = E˜
1
a · αa
1+αa
. Given that function φ(.) is strictly increasing (see Appendix 6.2)
and the fact that φ(h) = α, we have
h˜ = E˜
1
a · αa
1 + αa
> h⇔ aφ(h˜)
1 + aφ(h˜)
>
aφ(h)
1 + aφ(h)
⇔ aφ(h˜)
1 + aφ(h˜)
>
aα
1 + aα
⇔ 1− 1 + αa
αa
· aφ(h˜)
1 + aφ(h˜)
< 0
Using the fact that 1+αa
αa
=
eE
1
a
eh
we finally have:
h˜ > h⇔ G(h˜) = 1− 1
h˜
· E˜ 1a · aφ(h˜)
1 + aφ(h˜)
< 0
The stationary value of human capital is such that G(hm) = 0, and given that
function G(.) is strictly increasing, we therefore have the following inequality:
h < h˜ < hm.
Consider now an increase in the relative returns to multi-tasking from B
A
to
(
B∗
A∗
)
,
large enough and such that
E
1
a · αa
1 + αa
> h
∗
=
(
A∗
B∗
) 1
β−α
.
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Using the same argument as above, we show that
ĥ = E
1
a · αa
1 + αa
> h
∗ ⇔ aφ(ĥ)
1 + aφ(ĥ)
>
aφ(h
∗
)
1 + aφ(h
∗
)
⇔ aφ(ĥ)
1 + aφ(ĥ)
>
aα
1 + aα
⇔ 1− 1 + αa
αa
· aφ(ĥ)
1 + aφ(ĥ)
< 0
⇔ G(ĥ) = 1− 1
ĥ
· E 1a · aφ(ĥ)
1 + aφ(ĥ)
< 0
⇔ h∗ < ĥ < hm.
The transition dynamics from the initial specialization regime to multi-tasking follow
from Proposition 4. 
As one can guess, the education and technology shocks are required to be large
enough because the organizational decisions rely on a threshold level for human
capital. This should not be regarded as a weakness of the model. First of all,
the existence of such a threshold sounds as a crystal-clear regularity in the data
as reported in Section 2. Second, though our model does not explicitly consider
this aspect since we do not address the issue of the optimal skill composition in
the workplace, one might reinterpret the firm problem considered, with a distribu-
tion of human capital in mind. Either an education or a technological shock of any
non-negligible size will push at least some workers (whose human capital is near
the threshold) from specialization to multitasking. Of course, even with this inter-
pretation in mind, a massive move towards multi-tasking is only possible for large
enough education and/or technological shocks, but this can be hardly considered as
a weakness of the model, this is simply consistent with the data.
Let us now dig deeper in the transition proposition. While an increase in E or B/A
leads to the same transition from specialization to multi-tasking, the mechanisms at
work are slightly different. On the one hand, an increase in the efficiency of education
E increases the incentives to acquire education. For a given level of technological pa-
rameters, as the efficiency of education rises, the specialization equilibrium becomes
a sub-optimal work organization. This mechanism captures an efficiency effect: an
increase in the parameter E makes workers more able to perform a wider variety of
tasks, since it increases the efficiency of education. Education systems improving
cognitive abilities to become versatile, which translates in our model into a increase
in the productivity of the education technology, hence appears to be one major
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source of organizational change. For Lindbeck and Snower (2000), an important
determinant of organizational change indeed is the steady growth of human capital
per worker generated by education systems which made workers improve their per-
formance of particular skills and increase their ability to acquire a variety of skills.
Such an evolution motivates firms to reorganize work in favor of multi-tasking. For
Acemoglu (1999) as well, an increase in the productivity of education makes it more
profitable for skilled workers to work in reorganized firms (separately from unskilled
workers).
On the other hand, a shock on B/A reduces the threshold level above which firms
choose to allocate workers to several tasks. Such a shift in the threshold level of
human capital means that, for a given level of human capital, the ability of workers to
perform various tasks is enhanced when B/A increases. This mechanism captures
an allocation effect: an increase in B/A makes workers more easily allocated to
multi-tasking. Intuitively, ICT usage provide workers with more information, both
within firm and about customers, permitting employees to be more involved in multi-
tasking. Autor, Levy and Murname (2001) indeed document that the adoption of
ICT alters job content. Computer-based technologies substitute for routine tasks and
complement non-routine activities, suggesting that workers using such technologies
are required to become more versatile. An increase in the relative returns to multi-
tasking due to ICT is in our model a second major force stimulating the transition
from specialization to multi-tasking.
The novelty of our approach is to highlight, like Autor, Levy and Murname
(2001), the predominant role of the task content of employment. While the tradi-
tional skill-biased technical change literature emphasizes computerization and ICT
as a source of a demand shift favoring better-educated labor and increasing wage
inequality, we focus on the changing nature of jobs as technological change and ed-
ucation systems improve the ability of workers to perform a variety of new tasks,
that is to become more versatile.
Considering technological adoption in a historical perspective, there are several
examples of innovations favoring successively specialization and multi-tasking dur-
ing the twentieth century. Automobile production is a good illustration for this (see
Goldin and Katz, 1998). It began in large artisanal shops where automobiles were
assembled by highly skilled and versatile artisans. Technological advances associated
with the emergence of assembly lines led to standardized and interchangeable parts
that were assembled in factories by scores of less-skilled and specialized workers.
Our model can account for such reverse transitions from multi-tasking to specializa-
tion. Indeed, while ICT that have contributed to increase the returns to versatility,
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complementing non-routine activities and relying on higher human capital levels,
the emergence of assembly lines in the first part of the twentieth century increased
the returns to task specialization leading to wide-scale division of labor. This would
translate in our model into an increase in the ratio A/B, which leads, by symmetry
with an increase in B/A, to a transition from multi-tasking to specialization.
20
5 Conclusion
This paper provides theoretical foundations to the apparent complementarity be-
tween organizational change, ICT investment and human capital. In deciding whether
workers should specialize or perform multiple tasks, firms face a trade-off between
the returns from specialization and the returns from multi-tasking. The optimal
time allocation mode involves multi-tasking when the workers’ level of human cap-
ital is sufficiently high. The model has a unique steady state (specialization or
multi-tasking) which is globally stable.
Organizational change taking the form of a the transition from specialization to
multi-tasking occurs following two kinds of shocks: an increase in the productivity of
the human capital technology or an increase in the relative returns of multi-tasking.
The increase in the productivity of education, as well as the productivity effects
of ICT in terms of informational and technological task complementarity favor the
adoption of multi-tasking organizations, thereby explaining the contemporaneous
increase in computer usage, human capital accumulation and multi-tasking observed
in many OECD countries during the 1990s.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Empirical evidence in OECD countries
We report here some evidence that there exists a threshold level for human capital
above which workers receive better wages in the early 1990s, which corresponds
to the threshold above which the transition from specialization to multi-tasking
occurs in our model. Figure 1 draws the percentile distribution of gross earnings in
major OECD countries over the 1970-2000 period13. The data highlights that for all
countries except Japan, in the late 1980s-early 1990s, the mean wage starts being
lower than the 60th percentile distribution of gross earnings. In other words, in
the early 1990s, gross earnings at the top percentile distribution increase compared
to the mean wage, while at the bottom of the distribution, gross earnings remain
more or less flat. Hence, there seems to exist a threshold level for human capital
above which workers receive better wages in the early 1990s, which corresponds to
the threshold above which the transition from specialization to multi-tasking occurs
in our model.
[Insert Figure 1]
If we consider now the employment share of high and low skilled workers, distin-
guishing in particular those using new information and communication technologies.
Tables I to III clearly show two main trends in OECD countries: the diffusion of
new information and communication technologies and the increase in the employ-
ment share of skilled workers using computers.
Table I: Share of high and low skills within the ICT-related occupations in the
European Union and the United States, 2001
United States EU-14
Total computer-related occupations 67 55
Other high-skill ICT-related occupations 11 8
ICT low-skill occupations 22 37
Source: OECD (July 2004), based on the Eurostat Labour Force Survey and the US
Current Population Survey, May 2003
13We have chosen to report these data since gross earnings are independent of the tax system
that prevails in each country, thereby reflecting labour productivity independently of institutional
rules that affect the price of labour.
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Table II: Computer workers in the European Union, share in total occupations
1995 2001
Greece 0.22 0.36
Italy 0.71 1.09
Spain 0.53 1.13
Germany 0.98 1.68
Belgium 1.08 1.74
EU 1.00 1.76
France 1.31 1.84
Luxembourg 0.94 2.04
Finland (1997-2001) 1.29 2.15
Denmark 1.28 2.15
United Kingdom 1.02 2.33
Netherlands 1.99 3.18
Sweden (1997-2001) 2.23 3.42
Source: OECD (July 2004), based on the Eurostat Labour Force Survey and the US
Current Population Survey, May 2003
Table III: High-skilled (HS) ICT workers in the European Union and the United
States, Average annual employment growth (1995-01) (* = in 2001)
HS workers HS ICT-related Share of HS ICT workers
workers in total occupations*
Greece 1.29 3.19 0.56
United States 2.79 5.29 2.63
France 1.67 7.11 2.05
Italy 5.99 8.58 1.30
Belgium 2.13 8.91 2.01
Germany 1.66 9.41 1.90
Denmark 3.08 9.49 2.58
EU 2.79 10.11 2.01
Netherlands 4.14 10.31 3.54
Sweden (1997-2001) 3.47 12.29 3.85
United Kingdom 1.37 12.63 2.60
Luxembourg 4.06 14.28 2.22
Spain 7.46 15.92 1.38
Finland (1997-2001) 5.22 16.89 2.34
Source: OECD (July 2004), based on the Eurostat Labour Force Survey and the US
Current Population Survey, May 2003
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Regarding organizational change, notable changes have been observed at an ag-
gregate level in Europe during the 1990, in partiuclar in terms of paces and methods
of work, as shown in Table IV.
Table IV: Working conditions in Europe, 1990-2001
Population-weighted averages for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France,
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
and the United Kingdom
1990-91 1995-96 2000-01
Employees reporting working at very high speed 46 54 56
Employees reporting working to tight deadlines 50 56 60
Worker autonomy - order of tasks 64 64
Worker autonomy - pace of work 64 71 70
Worker autonomy - methods of work 60 71 70
Source: OECD Employment Outlook (2003), based on the European Survey on Working
Conditions, waves 1 to 3 (1990/91, 1995/96 and 2000
At the firm level now, in addition to Autor, Levy and Murname (2001), Osterman
(1994 and 2000) also reports that the proportion of American firms for which more
than 50% of its employees are involved in job rotation rose from 26.6% in 1992 to
55.5% in 1997. Caroli and Van Reenen (2001) document the same kind of trends
in British and French firms. In British establishments in particular, the proportion
of workers involved in organizational changes (having more responsiblity, a wider
range of tasks performed, more interesting or more skilled jobs) increased on average
from 25% in 1984 to 44% in 1990. The REPONSE survey conducted in French
establishments also show that the proportion of firms for which the majority of
its employees rotate among tasks amounted to 25.2% in 1998. Regarding German
firms, Carstensen (2002) observes the existence of two polar forms of organizations in
Germany: “tayloristic” organizations, based on labor specialization, and “holistic”
organizations, based on multi-tasking. She reports that between 1993 and 1997, 57
% of German firms have adopted new organizational forms based on job enrichment,
job enlargement and over time variability in task assignments. Holistic firms are also
more productive, experience positive marginal returns from reorganization towards
multi-tasking and rely on human capital accumulation strategies.
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6.2 Steady-state with multi-tasking
Deriving G(.) implies:.
G
′
(h) = E
1
a · 1
h
· aφ (h)
1 + aφ (h)
·
[
φ (h) (1 + aφ (h))− hφ′ (h)
hφ (h) (1 + aφ (h))
]
In turn,
G
′
(h) > 0⇔ φ (h) [1 + aφ (h)]− hφ′ (h) > 0
Deriving φ (.) yields:
φ
′
(h) =
2AB(α− β)2hα+β−1
[A(h)α +B(h)β]2
> 0
Hence,
G
′
(h) > 0⇔ [1 + aφ (h)] · 1
hφ′ (h) /φ (h)
> 1
We have:
hφ
′
(h) /φ (h) =
(2α− β)αA(h)α + β2B(h)β
(2α− β)A(h)α + βB(h)β −
αA(h)α + βB(h)β
A(h)α +B(h)β
Thus, after some calculations:
hφ
′
(h) /φ (h) ≶ 1
⇔ (2α− β) [x(h)]2 + β [y(h)]2 + [α(1− α) + β (2α− β)] [x(h)y(h)] ≷ 0
where x(h) ≡ A(h)α and y(h) ≡ B(h)β.
Hence, under assumption A1, we have 2α−β > 0 and therefore hφ′ (h) /φ (h) < 1.
In turn, since 1 + aφ (h) > 1 and 1
hφ′ (h)/φ(h) > 1, we have G
′
(h) > 0.
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6.3 Particular case under (C1): hs = h
This case is trivial and use the same arguments as before in a much simpler way.
Suppose for example ht < h = hs. Then, either ht+1 < h or ht+1 > h. In the former
case, we get immediately that the sequence ht is increasing and bounded above by
the fixed-point h, thus it is converging to this point. Indeed, if ht+1 < h, then
ht+1 = E(es)
a (ht)
1−a, and
ht+1
ht
= E(es)
a (ht)
−a > E(es)a (h)−a = 1.
Thus the sequence is strictly increasing. It is also obviously bounded from above by
the fixed-point because ht+1 < E(es)
a (h)1−a, which implies ht+1
h
< E(es)
a (h)−a =
1.
If ht < h but ht+1 > h, we can use exactly the same argument in the proof of
Proposition 2 for this case to get a contradiction and conclude that ht+1 cannot be
bigger than h. The remaining case ht > h is also settled more easily than in the
corresponding situation in Proposition 2.14
14Indeed, in such a case, if ht+1 is still above h, we can show as in the proof of Proposition 2
that the human capital sequence is then a strictly decreasing sequence, bounded from below by
h, which is precisely the fixed point of the map in the special case where (C1) is checked with
equality; so convergence is ensured immediately.
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